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EQUAL TERMS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND HOW DOES IT 
WORK: INTERPRETING THE EQUAL TERMS PROVISION OF THE 




In warm, sunny Broward County, Florida, a dispute arose between a 
church and local government.1  The church, Primera Iglesia Baustista 
Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. (Primera), purchased a house to renovate 
into a church.2  The county, which zoned the area for agricultural use, 
sought ―to protect, preserve and enhance the rural character and lifestyle 
of existing low density areas and agricultural uses.‖3  The two sides 
could not agree on how to use the land.  The dispute lasted nearly a 
decade, and each side spent countless hours and dollars on litigation 
over the equal terms provision of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).4 
Halfway across the country, in Indianapolis, a similar conflict arose 
when a small Baptist congregation leased a building for church 
services.5  Indianapolis, however, forbade religious use without a 
variance, having created a zone to serve as a ―buffer[] between 
residential . . . and entirely commercial or industrial districts.‖6  
However, the city permitted many different land uses without a 
variance, including auditoriums and assemblies.7  The Indianapolis 
parties also litigated under RLUIPA‘s equal terms provision.8 
Congress enacted RLUIPA in 2000, in response to a perceived need 
 
 * Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank all his friends and family for their support during the writing of this article and law school.  He 
would also like to thank Kate Ward and Jacob Dean for their guidance. 
 1. Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295 (11th 
Cir. 2006). 
 2. Id. at 1301. 
 3. Id. at 1300. 
 4. Primera purchased the property in December 1997 and the Eleventh Circuit ruled in June 
2006.  Id. at 1300. 
 5. Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 6. Id. (internal punctuation omitted). 
 7. Id. at 614–615. 
 8. Id. at 614. 
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to protect the religious liberty of land users, prisoners, and other 
institutionalized persons.9  This Comment addresses RLUIPA‘s land use 
provision, which covers two main areas of government action.  The first 
land use section prohibits governments from imposing laws that 
substantially burden religious exercise.10  The second land use provision 
addresses laws that discriminate against or exclude religious assemblies 
or institutions.11  The equal terms provision, in the latter section, 
provides that ―[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on 
less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.‖12 
Since RLUIPA‘s enactment, courts have struggled with interpreting 
the Act‘s different provisions.  The majority of the litigation has 
centered on the substantial burden section.  Recently, however, 
interpreting the equal terms provision has confounded the courts.  
Specifically, the courts have failed to reach uniform resolution on three 
main issues: (1) what qualifies as a religious assembly or institution,13 
(2) whether religious assemblies or institutions should be compared to 
similarly situated assemblies or institutions,14 and (3) what is the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.15 
Three circuits have addressed these issues, reaching different 
conclusions.  The Eleventh Circuit construed ―assemblies or 
institutions‖ in accordance with the terms‘ natural meaning and 
determined laws demonstrating unequal treatment must survive strict 
scrutiny.16  In contrast, the Third Circuit asserted the equal terms 
provision operates on a strict liability standard and has concluded all 
plaintiffs must identify a similarly situated secular comparator with 
 
 9. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006)); 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 
(2000). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (a) (2006). 
 11. Id. § 2000cc (b). 
 12. Id. § 2000cc (b)(1). 
 13. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004); 
River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 14. See, e.g., Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 370. 
 15. See, e.g., Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–1232; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 370–371. 
 16. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–1232. 
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respect to the ordinance‘s regulatory purpose.17  Finally, the Seventh 
Circuit held that all equal terms provision plaintiffs must present 
similarly situated assemblies or institutions with respect to ―accepted 
zoning criteria.‖18  The Seventh Circuit also determined the assembly 
definition should more closely consider the assembly‘s effect on the 
municipality and incorporated the Third Circuit‘s strict liability 
standard.19 
This circuit split has created unequal burdens on municipalities and 
religious assemblies across the country.  For example, the Indianapolis 
church, in the Seventh Circuit‘s jurisdiction, must present a similarly 
situated assembly or institution as a prerequisite to bringing a successful 
claim.  On the other hand, any challenged Broward County, Florida 
laws, in the Eleventh Circuit‘s jurisdiction, must serve a compelling 
government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or 
interest.  This unequal treatment has placed an inordinate burden on 
churches and governments in their efforts to comply with the law. 
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning 
criteria test, with minor changes, offers the best method to analyze the 
equal terms provision.  Part II of the Comment describes the 
circumstances surrounding RLUIPA‘s enactment and places the equal 
terms provision in context.  Part III illustrates the different courts‘ equal 
terms provision analysis.  In Part IV, this Comment critiques the 
circuits‘ assembly definition, similarly situated requirement, and 
scrutiny standard.  Finally, Part V concludes the Supreme Court should 
issue a guiding opinion that implements a modified version of the 
Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning criteria standard. 
II. HOW RLUIPA BECAME LAW 
Many contentious events surrounded RLUIPA‘s passage.  These 
events illuminate the motivation for the equal terms provision and place 
it in statutory context. 
 
 17. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268–269 (3rd 
Cir. 2007). 
 18. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 371. 
 19. Id. 
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A. The Free Exercise Struggle 
Congress‘s enactment of RLUIPA was the latest installment of a 
decade-long struggle between the judiciary and Congress over 
preserving religious liberty in America.  The Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith initiated this struggle.20  In Smith, the 
government denied a Native American unemployment benefits after his 
employer fired him for ingesting peyote as part of a religious practice.21  
The Court held that laws of general, neutral applicability do not need a 
compelling government interest when applied to religious practices.22  
Therefore, the Court found no free exercise violation.23  This ruling 
overturned the Sherbert v. Verner balancing test, which the courts 
employed for years and on which federal and state governments relied.24  
The Sherbert test required a compelling government interest for any law 
that substantially burdened religious exercise notwithstanding whether 
that law was neutrally applied.25  The resulting change adopted in Smith 
had the following consequences: (1) laws that had only an incidental 
affect on religious liberty were permissible,26 and consequently, (2) 
neutral and generally applicable laws infringing on religious liberties 
only needed to survive rational basis review.27 
The Supreme Court applied the Smith standard in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalue Aye, Inc. v. City of Hileah.28  There, a church claimed 
city ordinances that prevented the church from practicing animal 
sacrifice violated the Free Exercise Clause.29  The church had leased 
land, announced a plan to establish a house of worship, and had begun 
 
 20. Emp‘t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 21. Id. at 874. 
 22. Id. at 886. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  The Sherbert Court held that South Carolina could 
not constitutionally withhold unemployment benefits to an individual who was unemployed because she 
refused to work on her day of Sabbath.  Id. at 410. 
 25. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. 
 26. Id. at 878. 
 27. Id. at 878–885. 
 28. Church of the Lukumi Babalue Aye, Inc. v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 29. Id. at 527, 528. 
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to obtain the appropriate permits.30  The city subsequently passed a 
series of ordinances that ultimately banned only animal sacrifices, a 
religious practice of the church.31  The Lukumi Court invalidated the 
ordinances, holding they were religious gerrymandering, not neutral and 
generally applicable.32 
Despite decisions like Lukumi, Congress disagreed with Smith and 
quickly responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).33  RFRA expressly rejected Smith and intended to restore the 
Sherbert compelling interest test.34  Congress concluded that (1) 
religiously ―neutral‖ laws might still burden religious exercise, (2) 
governments need compelling justification to substantially burden 
religion, (3) Smith essentially eliminated the requirement that 
governments justify burdens imposed by neutral laws, and (4) the 
compelling interest test was functional.35 
The Supreme Court responded in-kind and struck down RFRA just 
four years later in City of Boerne v. Flores.36  The Boerne Court 
concluded that RFRA ―far exceed[s] any pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct‖ under the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause.37  
The Court struggled with RFRA‘s lack of a factual basis, finding a 
distinct absence of proof of hostility, burdens, or widespread patterns of 
discrimination.38  Therefore, ―[t]he stringent test RFRA demands of state 
laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means 
adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.‖39  In Boerne, the courts 
denied Congress‘s attempt to protect religious liberty. 
 
 30. Id. at 525, 526. 
 31. Id. at 526–528. 
 32. Id. at 535, 540. 
 33. The Supreme Court handed down the Employment Division v. Smith decision in 1990 and 
Congress passed RFRA in 1993. 
 34. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified 
as amendment at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (b)(1) (2006). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (a)(2)–(5). 
 36. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 37. Id. at 534. 
 38. Id. at 530–531. 
 39. Id. at 533. 
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B. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act: Building a 
Foundation. 
Only a few weeks after Boerne, the House of Representatives held a 
series of hearings entitled Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. 
Flores.40  Cognizant of the Boerne reasoning, Congress strove to collect 
information and gather support for legislation, which Congress deemed 
necessary to preserve religious freedom.41  The subsequent 
congressional hearings featured testimony from constitutional law 
scholars, religious leaders, and practicing attorneys.42 
RLUIPA‘s hearing record compiled ―massive evidence‖ that local 
governments all throughout the country had violated individuals‘ 
religious exercise rights.43  Senators Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy44 
concluded governments often facially discriminated against churches in 
zoning regulations and though land use regulation‘s ―highly 
individualized discretionary process.‖45  The record demonstrated 
zoning codes often excluded churches but permitted ―theaters, meeting 
halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for 
secular purposes.‖46  The studies found that discrimination occurred 
most often through ―vague and universally applicable‖ zoning reasons 
such as ―not consistent with the city‘s land use plan.‖47  In one instance, 
Los Angeles prohibited fifty elderly Jews from meeting for prayer in a 
 
 40. Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1071, 1079 (2010) (citing Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2 (1997); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores 
(Part II): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998); Protecting Religious 
Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part III): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 
(1998)). 
 41. See id.; 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000). 
 42. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774–S7777 (2000) (citing testimony and reports from Professor 
Douglas Laycock, Professor Jay Bybee, Thomas C Berg, and the Baptist Joint Committee on Public 
Affairs). 
 43. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000). 
 44. Senators Hatch and Kennedy worked on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and co-
sponsored the Senate RLUIPA bill.  Senator Hatch was the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary.  146 CONG. REC. S7774–S7775 (2000). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000). 
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six-square mile neighborhood.48  The city expressly said the 
neighborhood did not have room for a worship place and it did not want 
to create a precedent for one.49  However, the city permitted other 
assemblies to meet, including schools and recreational users.50 
Though most of the information was anecdotal, Congress also sought 
empirical information, and considered a study conducted by Brigham 
Young University (BYU).51  The study showed that small religious 
groups were ―vastly overrepresented in reported church zoning cases.‖52  
It highlighted, for example, that ―Jews account for only 2% of the 
population‖ but were involved in 20% of all litigation involving church 
locations.53  Based on all the evidence, the senators concluded that ―[i]t 
is impossible to make separate findings about every jurisdiction, or to 
legislate in a way that reaches only those jurisdictions that are guilty.‖54 
C. RLUIPA: The Act 
Given the discrimination described above, Congress drafted the 
following provisions as RLUIPA‘s land use section: 
(a) Substantial burdens 
(1) General rule: No government shall impose or implement a land 
use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or 
institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of 
the burden on that person, assembly, or institution— 
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and  
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest . . . . 
(b) Discrimination and exclusion 
 
 48. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 779 
(1999).  Senators Hatch and Kennedy cited this law review article in their joint statement before the 
Senate.  146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000). 
 49. Laycock, supra note 49, at 779. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 770–771 (citing a Brigham Young University study). 
 52. Id. at 771. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000). 
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(1) Equal terms: No government shall impose or implement a land 
use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or 
institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution.  
(2) Nondiscrimination: No government shall impose or implement a 
land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or 
institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination.  
(3) Exclusions and limits: No government shall impose or implement 
a land use regulation that— 
(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; 
or  
(B) unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions, or 
structures within a jurisdiction.
55
 
The substantial burden section also includes jurisdictional limits in 
(a)(2), which indicates the provision includes (1) any federal assistance 
programs, (2) anything affecting commerce, and (3) any government 
land use regulations.56 
D. The Equal Terms Provision in Context 
Many scholars compare the substantial burden section and equal 
terms provision57 even though the two are ―operatively independent.‖58  
Legislative history aids the interpretion of the provisions by 
demonstrating the emphasis and limitations drafters placed on each 
section. 
Especially instructive are the joint statements of Senators Hatch and 
Kennedy, and a coalition letter.59  The statements briefly explain the 
 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (2006). 
 57. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 41, at 1083–1085; Anthony Lazzaro Minervini, Comment, 
Freedom From Religion: RLUIPA, Religious Freedom, and Representative Democracy on Trial, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 571, 583 (2010). 
 58. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 59. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7774–S7777 (2000).  The referenced coalition letter is from the 
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, written by the general counsel of the Baptist Joint 
Committee on Public Affairs.  The letter is one of several included in the Congressional Record along 
with the joint statements by Senators Hatch and Kennedy.  The Congressional Record also includes a 
letter from the U.S. Department of Justice—Office of Legislative Affairs, and a letter from the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.  Id. 
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different sections‘ scrutiny standards.  The senators argued that 
widespread discrimination and individual assessments necessitated the 
heightened scrutiny level of the substantial burden section.60  For the 
equal terms provision, the senators indicated it ―enforce[s] the Free 
Exercise Clause rule against laws that burden religion and are not 
neutral and generally applicable.‖61  The coalition letter addressed the 
two sections in a similar fashion.  It justified the substantial burden 
section by highlighting the following: (1) the section does not grant 
religious assemblies immunity, (2) the claim will fail if a claimant 
cannot demonstrate a substantial burden, and (3) the government has the 
opportunity to rebut any substantial burden claim.62  After this lengthy 
substantial burden justification, the letter only mentions the equal terms 
provision in passing.63  This legislative history explains the difference 
between the provisions‘ scrutiny standards and suggests that Congress 
was much more concerned with the substantial burden section. 
Finally, the legislative history offers some sense of RLUIPA‘s 
limitations.  Senators Hatch and Kennedy admitted that the ―Act does 
not provide religious institutions with immunity from land use 
regulation.‖64  They further established that churches still have to apply 
for permits when available absent discrimination or unfair delay.65 
E. RLUIPA’s Impact and Burden on Local Governments 
Critics have since discovered flaws in the legislative process and 
congressional justification for RLUIPA.  For instance, while religious 
landowners testified about discrimination, no homeowners testified, and 
Congress denied local government organizations the opportunity to 
speak.66  Additionally, recent scholarship has questioned the BYU study 
 
 60. 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (2000). 
 61. Id. at S7776. 
 62. Id. at S7777. 
 63. The author discussed the equal terms provision in less than half a sentence.  Id. 
 64. Id. at S7776. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, ASS‘N OF AM. L. SCHS., 
http://www.aals/profdev/constitutional/hamilton.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010); see also Patricia E. 
Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: Evaluating the Creation of a Federal 
Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Government, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 207 (2008); Marci Hamilton, 
9
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for using outdated statistics and for analyzing only zoning decisions the 
plaintiffs appealed.67  For example, a New Haven, Connecticut study, 
which is more representative than the BYU study, found no evidence of 
bias.68  The study‘s author concluded that ―local governments remain 
capable of impartially evaluating‖ interests in land use disputes.69 
Just as Congress justified legislation with many anecdotal 
discrimination cases, other anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
municipalities have suffered substantial burdens under RLUIPA.  In 
Boulder, Colorado, officials have long sought to protect the county‘s 
―spectacular beauty‖ from Denver‘s encroaching suburbs.70  However, a 
church, which had already expanded from thirty-six families to 2,200 
people on a 55-acre plot, wanted to double its facility size.71  The parties 
went to court, and if Boulder lost, it would have had to pay both its own 
legal bills and the church‘s.72  Therefore, although Congress sought to 
alleviate burdens on one population through RLUIPA, it created a new 
set of burdens on a different population. 
RLUIPA was, in sum, the product of a decade-long struggle between 
the Executive and Judicial Branches over religious liberty regulations.  
Congress enacted RLUIPA due to a perceived need to protect the 
religious liberty of land users.  However, municipalities and courts have 
suffered their own burdens in light of RLUIPA. 
 
Struggling with Churches as Neighbors: Land Use Conflicts between Religious Institutions and Those 
Who Reside Nearby, FINDLAW (Jan. 17, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20020117.html. 
 67. Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look At Churches In The Zoning Process, 116 
YALE L.J. 859, 865–866, 868 (2007). 
 68. Id. at 861, 865.  Mr. Clowney argued New Haven, Connecticut was an excellent test subject 
for the following reasons: (1) the laws and demographics of the city: the medium-sized university town 
was full of educated elites ―who are often accused of being ‗hostile to religion and to churches,‖ and 
Connecticut laws made no special exceptions for religious land uses; (2) the heterogeneous mix of 
religious groups in New Haven ―roughly mirror[ed] the distribution of religious groups at a national 
level‖; and (3) the New Haven government maintained specific records on all zoning appeal applications 
filed since 1954.  Id. at 861–862. 
 69. Id. at 868. 
 70. Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
8, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/business/08religious.html?pagewanted=6&_r=2. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss1/5
2011] COMMENT—EQUAL TERMS AND RLUIPA 219 
III. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF RLUIPA‘S EQUAL TERMS 
PROVISION 
Despite the apparent simple and straightforward construction of the 
equal terms provision, courts have struggled with its interpretation and 
application.  Specifically, the circuits have conflicting views on three 
points.  First, the courts have divergent understandings on the definition 
and context of assembly or institution.  Second, the circuits are split over 
a similarly situated requirement.  Finally, the circuits have disagreed on 
the appropriate level of scrutiny. 
A. The Eleventh Circuit 
In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
first and most prominent equal terms provision decision, the court 
addressed an ordinance prohibiting churches and synagogues in seven of 
eight zoning districts.73  The ordinance permitted churches in the 
residential district only after obtaining a conditional use permit.74  Two 
Jewish congregations wanted a synagogue within walking distance of 
their homes—located in the town‘s business district—because Orthodox 
Judaism forbids using transportation on the Sabbath.75  Surfside claimed 
the ordinance was designed ―to invigorate the business district‖ and 
create a strong tax base.76  According to Surfside, allowing churches and 
synagogues would erode the tax base and cause economic hardship.77  
The Midrash court ruled that the ordinance violated RLUIPA‘s equal 
terms provision.78 
The Midrash court first analyzed the statutory construction of the 
substantial burden and nondiscrimination provisions, and concluded the 
provisions were ―operatively independent of one another.‖79  The court 
noted the substantial burden jurisdictional nexus did not apply to the 
 
 73. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1220, 1221. 
 76. Id. at 1221. 
 77. Id. at 1222. 
 78. Id. at 1219. 
 79. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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equal terms provision because ―§ (a)(2), by its terms, applies to 
‗subsection‘ (a).‖80 
The court then rejected the district court‘s similarly situated 
requirement on the basis that RLUIPA provisions ―require a direct and 
narrow focus.‖81  Instead, the court considered the congregation‘s claim 
in light of the category of ―assemblies or institutions.‖82  Therefore, 
before analyzing a potential statutory violation, the court needed to 
determine whether an entity qualified as an assembly or institution.83  
The court looked to assemblies‘ ―ordinary or natural meaning‖ for a 
definition, which was ―a company of persons collected together in one 
place usually and usually for some common purpose (as deliberation and 
legislation, worship, or social entertainment).‖84  Because Surfside 
treated churches and synagogues differently from private clubs and 
lodges—both organizations within the assemblies or institution 
definition—the court concluded Surfside violated the equal terms 
provision.85  In reaching this conclusion, the Midrash court asserted the 
equal terms provision codified free exercise jurisprudence.86  Therefore, 
the court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the law 
was neutral and generally applicable.87 
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently addressed the equal terms 
provision in Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. 
Broward County.88  There, a Baptist congregation sued based on the 
county‘s agricultural zone requirements.89  The Primera court ruled that 
a plaintiff must present a similarly situated ―nonreligious comparator‖ 
for any as-applied equal terms challenge, and the church had failed to 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1230. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (some internal formatting omitted).  The Midrash court got its definitions of assembly and 
institution from Webster‘s Dictionary and Black‘s Law Dictionary.  Id. 
 85. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 86. Id. at 1232. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006).  This Comment discussed the Primera facts in Part I.  A 
Baptist church filed an equal terms provision lawsuit after the County prevented the church from 
relocating in an agricultural use zone.  Id. at 1300–1302. 
 89. Id. at 1299–1300. 
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meet this burden.90  Therefore, the court upheld the Broward County 
ordinance excluding churches from the agricultural zone.91 
B. The Third Circuit 
In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals largely rejected the Eleventh 
Circuit‘s approach.92  Lighthouse was ―a Christian church that [sought] 
to minister the poor and disadvantaged in downtown Long Branch.‖93  
Lighthouse purchased property in Long Branch‘s ―Central Commercial 
District,‖ which permitted assembly halls and municipal buildings but 
excluded churches.94  Long Branch consistently denied Lighthouse‘s 
applications, even though Lighthouse wanted to use the property for 
activities like a soup kitchen and job skills training program.95 
In the midst of litigation, Long Branch changed its zoning ordinance 
and created a redevelopment plan to improve the city‘s revenue, job 
markets, and overall economic opportunities.96  Under the new plan, the 
city allowed studios and clubs, but expressly prohibited churches, 
schools, and government buildings in the commercial district.97  Long 
Branch also denied Lighthouse under the new ordinance, claiming a 
church would prevent the block from being used as ―a high end 
entertainment and recreation area.‖98 
The Lighthouse court first compared the equal terms and substantial 
burden sections, distinguishing the two based on the statute‘s plain text 
and legislative history.99  The court noted that § 2(a)(1), not § (2)(b)(1), 
provided the substantial burden requirement, and the court further found 
 
 90. Id. at 1311–1313. 
 91. Id. at 1314. 
 92. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir. 2007). 
 93. Id. at 256. 
 94. Id. at 257. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 258. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 259 (3rd Cir. 
2007). 
 99. Id. at 262. 
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no legislative history connecting the provisions.100 
Addressing the similarly situated component, the court held plaintiffs 
must show a similarly situated ―secular comparator‖ with respect to the 
challenged ordinance‘s ―regulatory purpose.‖101  The court considered 
the free exercise analysis, which compares secular and religious conduct 
that ―has a similar impact on the regulation‘s aims.‖102  In requiring a 
similarly situated comparator, the Third Circuit rejected the Midrash 
assembly categorization.103 
The court also rejected the Eleventh Circuit‘s scrutiny standard, 
holding the ―[e]qual [t]erms provision operates on a strict liability 
standard; strict scrutiny does not come into play.‖104  Under this 
standard, if a land use regulation treats secular and religious assemblies 
unequally, the court automatically invalidates the regulation.105  The 
court found the strict liability standard in the statute‘s plain text, arguing 
that the exclusion of strict scrutiny in the equal terms provision, coupled 
with its inclusion in the substantial burden section, demonstrated 
congressional intent.106 
After evaluating these factors, the Lighthouse court determined the 
original ordinance, but not the redevelopment plan, violated the equal 
terms provision.107  The original ordinance failed because the court 
rejected the assertion that churches would cause greater harm to the 
regulatory purposes than an unspecified assembly hall.108  The 
redevelopment plan, however, survived scrutiny because ―churches are 
not similarly situated to the other allowed assemblies with respect to‖ 
the plan‘s economic development goals.109 
 
 100. Id. at 262–263. 
 101. Id. at 264. 
 102. Id. at 266. 
 103. Id. at 268. 
 104. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3rd Cir. 
2007). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 270, 272. 
 108. Id. at 272. 
 109. Id. at 270. 
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C. The Seventh Circuit 
In River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Hazel Crest,110 the Seventh 
Circuit issued the most recent equal terms provision ruling, which 
significantly shifted the circuit split balance.  The Seventh Circuit noted 
that its jurisdiction had previously111 ―followed the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
interpretation.‖112  However, in Hazel Crest, the circuit adopted a test 
similar to the Third Circuit approach. 
The regulation challenged in Hazel Crest concerned a business 
district zone that permitted a wide variety of commercial and retail uses, 
including recreational buildings and community centers, but excluded 
churches.113  The town had suffered many years of economic decline 
and the city hoped to revitalize the area as a commercial center.114  A 
church, River of Life, challenged the regulation.  River of Life had only 
sixty-seven members, operated out of a warehouse, and purchased a 
building for relocation.115  After the church filed an equal terms 
provision claim, Hazel Crest amended its ordinance to exclude some 
secular assemblies, including meeting halls, schools, and community 
centers.116  The court upheld the town‘s zoning ordinance,117 reaching its 
conclusion largely through analyzing the other circuits‘ interpretations 
of equal terms provision. 
The Seventh Circuit vehemently disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
assembly definition and strict scrutiny analysis.118  The court criticized 
the Eleventh Circuit‘s assembly analysis as reading the statute too 
literally by including ―any ‗assembly,‘‖ and argued the approach ―would 
 
 110. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 111. The previous cases include the following: Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of 
Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003); Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 
2006); and Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 112. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 377 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 368, 377. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 368. 
 116. Id. at 364, 368. 
 117. Id. at 374. 
 118. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369–370 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
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give religious land uses favored treatment.‖119  The Hazel Crest court 
asserted the broad assembly definition would encompass most secular 
land uses, such as parks and soup kitchens, because ―visitors to each 
have a ‗common purpose‘ in visiting.‖120  The assembly definition 
should instead, according to the court, focus on the assemblies‘ effects 
―on the municipality and its residents.‖121  The Seventh Circuit 
subsequently argued the Eleventh Circuit‘s strict scrutiny requirement 
was unnecessary for two reasons: (1) there was no textual basis for the 
claim and (2) ―religious discrimination is expressly prohibited elsewhere 
in the statute.‖122 
The Hazel Crest court then argued the Third Circuit‘s regulatory 
purpose test gave local authorities too much subjective leeway.123  The 
circuit therefore shifted the focus ―from regulatory purpose to accepted 
zoning criteria.‖124  Accepted zoning criteria would prevent local 
authorities from manipulating their zoning regulations and would 
instead allow federal judges to apply more objective standards.125 
The Hazel Crest court then analyzed potential accepted zoning 
criteria before upholding Hazel Crest‘s amended ordinance.126  The 
Seventh Circuit postulated that separate zoning areas, including 
residential and municipal, would ―insure a better and more economical 
use of municipal services.‖127  Therefore, Hazel Crest was not unique to 
exclude churches and non-commercial assemblies from a certain 
zone.128  The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that treating ―religious and 
secular land uses . . . the same from the standpoint of an accepted zoning 
criteria, such as ‗commercial district,‘ or ‗residential district,‘ . . . is 
enough to rebut‖ an equal terms provision claim.129 
In sum, the circuits that have addressed the equal terms provision 
 
 119. Id. at 369. 
 120. Id. at 370. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 370–371. 
 123. Id. 
 124. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 371–374. 
 127. Id. at 372. 
 128. Id. at 373. 
 129. Id. 
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lawsuits differ on three primary issues.  First, the circuits split on the 
appropriate assembly definition.  The Eleventh Circuit defined assembly 
within its ―ordinary or natural meaning[],‖130 while the Third and 
Seventh Circuits criticized this definition as too broad.131  Second, the 
circuits split over the similarly situated requirement.  The Third and 
Seventh Circuits applied a similarly situated requirement in relation to 
the ordinance‘s regulatory purpose and accepted zoning criteria 
respectively.132  The Eleventh Circuit rejected the similarly situated 
requirement all together.133  Third, the circuits split on the appropriate 
level of scrutiny, with the Eleventh Circuit applying a strict scrutiny 
analysis134 while the Third and Seventh Circuits appled strict liability.135 
IV. DISCUSSION: EVALUATING THE COURTS‘ INTERPRETATION OF THE 
EQUAL TERMS PROVISION 
The Seventh Circuit offers the best equal terms provision test.  With 
some modifications and additions, all courts should implement the Hazel 
Crest standard.  This subpart first discusses the assembly definition, 
which the courts should define in an economic context, contrary to the 
circuits‘ current approaches.  Next, this subpart considers the similarly 
situated comparator element, for which the Seventh Circuit, with its 
accepted zoning criteria standard, presented the best analysis.  Finally, 
this subpart analyzes the potential scrutiny standards and concludes the 
Third Circuit appropriately chose a strict liability standard. 
A. Assembly Definition: Why an Economic Context? 
The courts should define assembly in terms of the assembly‘s 
economic impact instead of the ordinary or natural meaning.136  The 
 
 130. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 131. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268 (3rd Cir. 
2007); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 132. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 264; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 371. 
 133. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230. 
 134. Id. at 1232. 
 135. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269; Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 371. 
 136. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232. 
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Eleventh Circuit alone defined assembly in its ordinary and natural 
meaning—a company of people usually collected in one place for a 
common purpose.137  Instead of offering an alternative definition, the 
Third and Seventh Circuits merely argued this interpretation was too 
broad.138  Despite not offering a new definition, the Third and Seventh 
Circuits correctly assessed the Eleventh Circuit‘s approach.  The 
Seventh Circuit offered better reasoning, explaining that the definition 
was too broad because it would encompass secular land uses that have 
different effects on the municipality.139  The courts could solve the 
broad definition issue and concerns over municipality effect by defining 
assembly in an economic context. 
Defining assembly in an economic context would solve several 
problems.  First, it would cover the impact on a municipality.  
Furthermore, defining assembly in an economic context would provide a 
clear definition to an otherwise ambiguous provision, and it would offer 
a balanced approach to help diffuse the burdens on churches and 
municipalities.  Finally, using the economic context approach would 
shift some of the zoning power back to municipalities.  Courts could 
apply this economic assembly definition in several different manners.  
For example, the courts could define an assembly as a group of people 
collected for a common purpose that generates a certain amount or 
percentage of tax revenue. 
Scholars and officials at all levels have long considered cultivating 
economic growth on a local scale a priority.  Leading urban planning 
experts have asserted that cities are the ―economic engine of society.‖140  
President Clinton recognized this when he enacted legislation that 
offered tax incentives to spur economic growth in certain urban areas.141  
Other scholars have concluded that ―commerce and industry . . . [are] 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268; River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 
611 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 139. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 370. 
 140. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 63, 96 (2009) (citing scholars Jane Jacobs and Professor Richard Schragger). 
 141. Jennifer Forbes, Note, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for Urban 
Revitalization: A Comparison of Empowerment Zones and New Markets Tax Credits, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 177, 183 (discussing the EZ/EC tax incentives enacted after the Los Angeles riots as part of a 
domestic policy shift using market-based incentives to revitalizes urban areas). 
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necessary and desirable elements of the community.‖142 
In many of the equal terms provision lawsuits, municipalities had 
defined zones based on economic need, illustrating the importance and 
impact of economics on local governments.  The Hazel Crest court 
concluded the city ―created a commercial district that excludes churches 
along with community centers‖ because none of these assemblies, ―like 
churches . . . generate significant taxable revenue or offer shopping 
opportunities.‖143  Surfside, the town in Midrash, argued it designed the 
ordinance to create a strong tax base and invigorate the business 
district.144  In Lighthouse, Long Branch‘s amended redevelopment plan 
strove to improve the city‘s revenue and job opportunities.145  Defining 
assembly in economic terms would allow cities to meet these economic 
needs. 
Defining assembly in an economic context would also alleviate some 
of the burden municipalities have suffered while still recognizing 
congressional intent.  Despite efforts to compromise, municipalities 
have faced litigation, suffered large legal fees, and have had their efforts 
to exercise the police power through zoning impaired.146  Furthermore, 
the evidence relied upon by Congress to support RLUIPA has recently 
been scrutinized.  For instance, neither homeowners nor municipalities 
testified at the congressional hearings,147 and subsequent studies have 
rebuffed the empirical evidence supporting RLUIPA.148  Though these 
factors do not invalidate the anecdotal discrimination cases, they suggest 
the equal terms provision burdens municipalities more than legislators 
intended.  Senators Hatch and Kennedy explicitly said RLUIPA leaves 
 
 142. Harry B. Madsen, Noncumulative Zoning in Illinois, 37 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 105, 113 (1960). 
 143. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 373.   
 144. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1221–1222 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 145. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 258 (3rd Cir. 
2007). 
 146. See Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 253–255 (highlighting several examples of drawn out 
legal battles, including a dispute involving a Jewish congregation that wanted to add an additional 
20,000-square feet to a Victorian home in a historic district that included a 5,000-square foot home for 
the rabbi); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing how the dispute between the church 
and government in Primera lasted from 1997–2006). 
 147. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 207. 
 148. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 257; Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local 
Land Use Decisions: Lessons From RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 717, 754 (2008). 
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all policy choices to the states.149  Defining assembly in economic terms 
would permit municipalities to regulate based on economic need where 
they see fit.  Just as RLUIPA was a compromise between the judiciary 
and legislature,150 this assembly definition would serve as a compromise 
between churches and municipalities. 
Permitting municipalities to zone based on economic need would also 
return some local authority to zoning, an area local governments 
traditionally controlled.151  The judiciary treated zoning laws 
deferentially under the original zoning conception and gave 
municipalities great control over land use planning.152  However, as 
scholars have indicated, municipalities under modern zoning often take 
a wait-and-see approach, which has led to a highly discretionary and 
individualized assessment-zoning method.153  Through RLUIPA 
Congress sought to prevent this individualized assessment.  Adopting an 
economic assembly definition would protect churches by establishing 
explicit criteria but also return some zoning control to municipalities. 
For these reasons, the courts should define assembly within an 
economic context for the benefit of both municipalities and religious 
assemblies. 
B. Similarly Situated Comparator and Accepted Zoning Criteria 
Under this Comment‘s proposed equal terms provision analysis, 
courts should require plaintiffs to present similarly situated assemblies 
with respect to the accepted zoning criteria the city implements.  The 
Third and Seventh Circuits use the similarly situated element.  The 
Third Circuit evaluated the similarly situated assembly in light of the 
municipality‘s regulatory purpose.  The Seventh Circuit‘s consideration 
 
 149. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000). 
 150. Congress demonstrated the first signs of compromise when it responded to Boerne by 
attempting to compile ―massive evidence of discrimination.‖  Furthermore, before Congress passed 
RLUIPA, the Senate Judiciary Committee drafted the Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999.  
However, the bill never made it out of the committee due in part to the Act‘s wide scope.  Salkin & 
Lavine, supra note 67, at 205–206. 
 151. Ostrow, supra note 149, at 719. 
 152. Ostrow, supra note 149, at 721; see also Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (establishing judicial deference). 
 153. Ostrow, supra note 149, at 734, 735. 
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of accepted zoning criteria, and not the regulatory purpose, offered an 
objective analysis point designed to protect churches and municipalities.  
This subpart first addresses the similarly situated component and then 
applies it to the accepted zoning criteria. 
1. Similarly Situated Comparator 
Analyzing equal terms provision claims based on a similarly situated 
assembly is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and congressional 
intent.  Furthermore, all three circuits have, at least arguably, adopted 
the similarly situated requirement. 
The Eleventh Circuit first expressed contradictory reasoning by using 
a similary situated standard in Midrash before adopting that standard in 
Primera.  After the Midrash court ruled the equal terms provision 
needed a more direct and narrow focus than a similarly situated 
standard, the court asserted the equal terms provision codified the Smith-
Lukumi free exercise precedent.154  This precedent established that a 
―zoning law is not neutral or generally applicable if it treats similarly 
situated secular and religious assemblies differently.‖155  The Primera 
court subsequently applied a similarly situated standard to as applied 
equal terms provision challenges.156  Therefore, at best, the Eleventh 
Circuit adopted the similarly situated requirement.  At worst, the 
Eleventh Circuit contradicted itself. 
Regardless of the Eleventh Circuit‘s determination, the Third and 
Seventh Circuits‘ similarly situated requirement is consistent with 
congressional intent and free exercise precedent.  RLUIPA‘s authors 
explicitly designed the equal terms provision to ―enforce the Free 
Exercise Clause rule‖ against laws that are not neutral and generally 
applicable.157  As the Midrash court described, Free Exercise Clause 
precedent analyzes similarly situated comparators to determine any 
constitutional violations.158  The circuits subsequently created different 
 
 154. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 155. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). 
 156. Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1311 
(11th Cir. 2006). 
 157. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000). 
 158. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232. 
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standards based on this Free Exercise Clause influence.  While the 
Eleventh Circuit adopted the strict scrutiny standard, the Third Circuit 
read the free exercise implications to require a similarly situated 
standard.159 
The similarly situated requirement is the most appropriate analysis, as 
essentially all three circuits adopted it, and it is consistent with 
precedent and congressional intent.  Having established why plaintiffs 
must present a similarly situated comparator, this subpart will now 
consider the basis for other institutions to be considered similarly 
situated to the religious assemblies. 
2. Accepted Zoning Criteria 
The Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning criteria analysis offers the best 
test.  It requires equal terms provision plaintiffs to present similarly 
situated comparators with respect to the ordinance‘s accepted zoning 
criteria.160  This objective standard will protect municipal interests, 
religious liberty, and satisfy congressional concerns about 
discrimination. 
The Third Circuit‘s regulatory purpose test, on the other hand, leaves 
the door open for individualized assessment and discrimination.  The 
Seventh Circuit summarized the problem well: 
[T]he use of ‗regulatory purpose‘ as a guide to interpretation invites 
speculation concerning the reason behind the exclusion of churches; 
invites self-serving testimony by zoning officials and hired expert 
witnesses; facilitates zoning classifications thinly disguised as neutral but 
actually systematically unfavorable to churches . . . .
161
 
This discretionary freedom directly contradicts what Senators Hatch and 
Kennedy sought to accomplish.  The Lighthouse case itself illustrates 
the problem.  The Third Circuit, in upholding the ordinance, overlooked 
Long Branch‘s subjective intent when it changed the zoning ordinance, 
with the new purpose to improve the city‘s economic market, in the 
 
 159. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 266 (3rd Cir. 
2007). 
 160. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 161. Id. 
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midst of litigation.162 
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit‘s accepted zoning criteria protects 
against individualized assessment and subjective intent by providing 
objective standards.  The court‘s Hazel Crest decision offered some 
examples of objective, accepted zoning criteria, including maintaining 
parking space, traffic control, and generating municipal revenue.163  
Establishing objective criteria would put all parties on notice.  Churches 
would know where they could locate, and municipalities would know 
the accepted regulation criteria.  Furthermore, as the Hazel Crest court 
noted, federal judges could easily apply the criteria to resolve 
lawsuits.164 
In Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, the Tenth 
Circuit explained why objective standards do not create individualized 
assessment.165  The case concerned an ordinance that mandated certain 
variance denials, which forced the zoning board to deny a church‘s 
request to operate a day care.166  The court held the denial was not an 
individualized assessment because the ordinance application was based 
on objective criteria and the board had no discretion.167  This same logic 
applies to any zoning laws once the municipality integrates its accepted 
zoning criteria into the ordinances. 
Though accepted zoning criteria protects against individualized 
assessments, the judiciary must vigilantly apply the test.  In both 
Lighthouse and Hazel Crest, the courts misapplied the standard.  In each 
case, the municipality changed the zoning ordinance or plan once the 
religious assembly applied for a permit.  In Lighthouse, the city created 
the redevelopment plan to improve the city‘s economy and added 
schools and government buildings to the prohibition list.168  The Hazel 
Crest town amended the ordinance to exclude more secular assemblies, 
 
 162. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 258. 
 163. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 373. 
 164. Id. at 371. 
 165. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 166. Id. at 654. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 256, 258 (3rd 
Cir. 2007). 
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including meeting halls, schools, and community centers.169  These 
changes, after the religious assembly instituted a zoning request, are the 
same type of discrimination Congress sought to protect against.  
Therefore, courts cannot permit these post-request plan alterations for 
the accepted zoning criteria standard to truly uphold free exercise 
precedent and legislative intent. 
Though some disapprove of the accepted zoning criteria because it 
adds to the statute‘s plain text,170 practicality concerns also make it the 
best test.  As Judge Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit noted, ―[A]lthough 
Congress may have intended to prescribe a standard more open-
ended . . . its application, as a practical matter requires . . . some 
limitations to be provided by the judiciary.‖171  The practicality relates 
to the burden municipalities and religious assemblies have suffered 
through an open-ended standard and the judicial-congressional struggle 
over religious liberty protection laws.  After the Supreme Court‘s denial 
of legislative attempts to combat discrimination, adding these 
requirements to the plain text satisfies the judiciary and addresses the 
congressional concerns. 
Applying the accepted zoning criteria standard to previous free 
exercise and equal terms provision cases would lead to a similar 
outcome.  The standard covers the Lukumi religious gerrymandering 
concerns by forcing municipalities to adopt accepted criteria that apply 
across the board.  Applied to equal terms provision cases—such as the 
dispute involving the Indianapolis Baptist church—religious 
organizations would prevail because they are similarly situated to 
assembly halls and auditoriums, which are permitted in these zones.172  
The Boulder ordinance should also survive, because maintaining an 
agricultural zone could be an accepted zoning criterion.173  Finally, the 
 
 169. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 368. 
 170. See, e.g., Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Campbell, supra note 41, at 1105 (―The lower courts‘ approaches to interpreting the equal terms 
provision seriously distort Congress‘s intent and weaken RLUIPA‘s protections for religious liberty as a 
consequence.  Courts should avoid the pitfalls of these interpretations by adopting a textual 
interpretation of RLUIPA‘s equal terms provision.‖). 
 171. Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d at 374 (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
 172. Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614 (7th Cir. 2007); see also 
infra Part I (describing Digrugilliers, 506 F.3d 612). 
 173. Henriques, supra note 71 (illustrating that the city is not religiously gerrymandering to 
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ordinance at issue in Midrash would still fail because it allowed 
similarly situated private clubs and lodges with respect to the accepted 
zoning criterion of creating a strong tax base.174 
For these reasons, courts should evaluate all equal terms provision 
claims based on similarly situated comparators with respect to accepted 
zoning criteria. 
C. Scrutiny: The Lack of a Need for a Strict Scrutiny Standard 
The appropriate scrutiny level is the final point to address.  A strict 
scrutiny standard is unnecessary for several reasons.  First, Congress 
included a strict scrutiny analysis in RLUIPA‘s substantial burden 
section, a completely separate section from the equal terms provision.  
Second, other sections of RLUIPA have built-in standards that address 
the strict scrutiny concerns.  Finally, by the time the accepted zoning 
criteria analysis applies strict scrutiny, the ordinance would have already 
undergone a searching scrutiny.  Therefore, courts should implement a 
strict liability standard for the equal terms provision. 
RLUIPA‘s substantial burden section—not the equal terms 
provision—offers governments the opportunity to justify their 
regulations through a strict scrutiny analysis.  The equal terms provision 
merely states ―no government shall impose . . . a land use 
regulation . . . .‖175  Courts and commentators have concluded the two 
provisions are ―operatively independent,‖ a telling indicator that the 
equal terms provision does not utilize a strict scrutiny analysis.176  The 
Lighthouse case used the operative independence inference to conclude 
that ―[s]ince Congress evidently knew how to require a showing of a 
substantial burden, it must have intended not to do so in the [e]qual 
 
exclude the school because the policy has long been in place). 
 174. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1221–1222 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006). 
 176. See, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 762 (7th Cir. 
2003); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1229; see also Campbell, supra note 41, at 1100 (―The substantial burden 
provision explicitly provides that land-use regulations that substantially burden religious exercise should 
be evaluated under a compelling interest test. The equal terms provision, appearing in the very next 
section of RLUIPA, lacks any similar requirement.‖); Minervini, supra note 58, at 583 (―It is important 
to note at the outset that the Discrimination and Exclusion provisions of the RLUIPA operate 
independently of the Substantial Burden provision . . . .‖). 
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[t]erms provision.‖177 
 The legislative history justifying these two sections reemphasizes 
the Lighthouse conclusion.  Senators Hatch and Kennedy spent a 
significant amount of time justifying the strict scrutiny standard of the 
substantial burden section while only mentioning that the equal terms 
provision enforced the Free Exercise Clause.178  The justification efforts 
also signify the importance and emphasis drafters placed on the two 
provisions.179 
The Hazel Crest court offered some insightful contextual comments 
with respect to the weight drafters placed on the equal terms provision.  
Specifically, the majority considered that the ―equal terms provision is 
not the only or even the most important protection against religious 
discrimination by zoning authorities.‖180  The opinion further described 
the many other RLUIPA land use provisions that protect religious 
liberty, including the substantial burden section, the nondiscrimination 
provision, and the exclusion and limits provision.181  Furthermore, as 
one scholar noted, reading a strict scrutiny analysis into the equal terms 
provision would essentially duplicate the substantial burden section.182 
All of these factors demonstrate that the equal terms provision does 
not require a strict scrutiny analysis.  However, one must also consider 
that under the proposed equal terms provision test, the ordinance will 
have already undergone the searching scrutiny the Eleventh Circuit 
sought to enact through strict scrutiny.  The Eleventh Circuit, with a 
broad assembly definition, permits many equal terms provision claims to 
proceed before analyzing them under strict scrutiny.  The accepted 
zoning criteria test allows fewer qualifying plaintiffs, but the test 
 
 177. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 263 (3rd Cir. 
2007) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
 178. 146 CONG. REC. S7775–S7776 (2000). 
 179. In addition to the Senators‘ statements justifying the two provisions, as noted in Part IID, the 
general counsel for the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion wrote a letter included in the 
legislative history.  The author justified the substantial burden section by highlighting the following: (1) 
the section does not grant religious assemblies immunity, (2) if a claimant cannot demonstrate a 
substantial burden the claim will fail, and (3) the government has the opportunity to rebut any 
substantial burden claim.  146 CONG. REC. S7777 (2000). 
 180. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 374 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 67, at 247. 
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immediately invalidates the ordinance if it meets the initial criteria. 
Therefore, as the Lighthouse court concluded, the ―[e]qual [t]erms 
provision operates on a strict liability standard; strict scrutiny does not 
come into play.‖183 
V. CONCLUSION 
The best equal terms provision analysis requires plaintiffs to present 
similarly situated comparators with respect to the ordinance‘s accepted 
zoning criteria, and applies strict liability once the plaintiff has met that 
standard.  This analysis solves several problems.  First, the analysis 
acknowledges the struggle between Congress and the judiciary over 
religious liberty jurisprudence by advocating a compromise that 
addresses each side‘s concerns.  Second, the compromise alleviates the 
burdens felt by both municipalities and religious land users.  For 
example, Boulder, Colorado, could justify its regulations without fear of 
spending thousands of dollars on litigation, and the Indianapolis Baptist 
church could locate in its requested area.  The test offers clear criteria 
for all parties—religious land users, municipalities, and the courts.  
Finally, the test addresses free exercise and congressional discrimination 
concerns.  The objective accepted zoning criteria would uncover any 
municipal religious gerrymandering attempts and strike down laws that 
are not neutral and generally applicable. 
The Supreme Court needs to issue a guiding opinion to this respect.  
Then, all parties will have a clear standard, and a Florida evangelical 
church and a Chicago synagogue will be treated the same.  The Supreme 
Court must explicitly address situations where municipalities change 
their zoning ordinances after a religious land user initiates a zoning 
request.  So long as the Supreme Court addresses this issue or, in the 
alternative, the lower courts adopt the test and self-regulate, courts will 
have an effective method by which to analyze equal terms provision 
challenges. 
 
 183. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269. 
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